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ow
nloaded fromClimate change threatens agricultural productivity worldwide, resulting in higher food prices. Associated economic
gains and losses differ not only by region but also between producers and consumers and are affected by market
dynamics. On the basis of an impact modeling chain, starting with 19 different climate projections that drive plant
biophysical process simulations and ending with agro-economic decisions, this analysis focuses on distributional
effects of high-end climate change impacts across geographic regions and across economic agents. By estimating
the changes in surpluses of consumers and producers, we find that climate change can have detrimental impacts on
global agricultural welfare, especially after 2050, because losses in consumer surplus generally outweigh gains in
producer surplus. Damage in agriculturemay reach the annual loss of 0.3%of future total gross domestic product at
the end of the century globally, assuming further opening of trade in agricultural products, which typically leads to
interregional production shifts to higher latitudes. Those estimated global losses could increase substantially if in-
ternational trade ismore restricted. If beneficial effects of atmospheric carbon dioxide fertilization can be realized in
agricultural production, much of the damage could be avoided. Although trade policy reforms toward further
liberalization help alleviate climate change impacts, additional compensation mechanisms for associated environ-
mental and development concerns have to be considered.h 
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Climate change and rising global mean temperature (GMT) with asso-
ciated consequences pose a serious threat to natural systems and socio-
economic well-being (1). The agricultural sector in particular is very
sensitive to climate change (2). Even a small increase of 1° to 2°C in
GMT can have significant negative effects on crop yields, especially in
the tropics (3–5). In many developing regions, agriculture is of major
importance for national economic performance, for example, as ex-
pressed by its share in gross domestic product (GDP) (6, 7). Global
economic losses in production of three major crops (wheat, maize,
and barley) attributed to climate change in the recent past are esti-
mated at approximately US$5 billion per year (8). With prospects of
continued global warming, the implications of this damage could be
substantial for poor regions, with its severity highly dependent on a
country’s future development path.
Climate change impacts on agriculture and resulting changes in
production patterns and prices affect both producers and consumers,
changing the profitability of agricultural production and the share of
income spent on food (9, 10). The distribution of climate change im-
pacts on economic surpluses is consequently determined not only by
the spatial features of climatic change and its impact on crop yields
but also by the response of global land use patterns and trade, as well
as the balancing of consumer and producer surplus (gains and losses). If
food prices increase because of climate change impacts, households not
only will have to spend more income on food consumption but also
could face a risk of nutritional shortage and insufficient access to food
(11). A better understanding of climate change effects on different eco-
nomic agents, including potential adaptation options, can help imple-ment suitable policies at the national and international level to buffer
against potential impacts (12). Trade is seen as one of the most impor-
tant adaptation options because it can account for changes in global
patterns of agricultural productivity, and thus allows for reducing pro-
duction cost and enhancing food security (13–15).
Here, we analyze climate change impacts on agricultural welfare on a
global and regional scale, which are measured as changes in “consumer
surplus” and “producer surplus.” The impacts are dynamically assessed
for the period from 1995 to 2095 using the agro-economic land use op-
timization model MAgPIE (Model of Agricultural Production and its
Impacts on the Environment; see Materials and Methods and the Sup-
plementaryMaterials) (16, 17). Although there is a considerable amount
of literature on climate impacts on crop yields (5, 18), few studies have
analyzed the subsequent economic welfare effects (12, 15, 19, 20).
MAgPIE is well suited to translate biophysical into economic impacts
because crop yield patterns and water availability that are directly
affected by climate change enter the economicmodel as spatially explicit
biophysical constraints. The surplus concepts are standard analytical
tools in welfare economics (21, 22). Under agricultural welfare, we con-
sider economic surplus from agricultural activities related only to plant
cultivation and livestock production.Other agricultural subsectors, such
as forestry and fishery, are not studied here. Producer surplus is equiv-
alent to the production profit, that is, the difference between total reve-
nues andproduction-associated costs (Fig. 1,A andB, red area). Consumer
surplus is the difference between a consumer’s willingness to pay for a
certain good and the amount he or she actually pays for it at the market
price (Fig. 1, A and B, blue area). Consumer behavior is fully determi-
nistic in MAgPIE by exogenously defined demand trajectories for agri-
cultural products (23), which implies an unbounded willingness of
consumers to purchase at the market. In the case of a negative impact
on the production side, the supply curve shifts upward (or leftward),
and the equilibrium price increases to a new level, implying shifts in
surpluses (Fig. 1B). Climate change–induced welfare impacts for food1 of 9
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 producers and consumers are calculated in this analysis based on these
differences in surpluses. Three indicators are considered: change in
consumer surplus, change in producer surplus, and change in total
agricultural welfare (the last indicator being the sum of the first two)
(Fig. 1C). The economic valuation of climate change impacts in agri-
culture is measured by chosen indicators as a percentage change with
respect to the value of future total GDP [provided by selected economic
projections from the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES)
(24)], thereby implying the effect of agricultural sector on total economic
welfare. Details on economic surplus inMAgPIE are provided in the Sup-
plementary Materials.
The market response to a climate shock is obtained through the
comparison of results from a scenario with climate effect on crop yields
with a reference scenario where climate conditions are fixed at the ini-
tial level in 1995. Here, we focus on high-end impacts, driving the
MAgPIE model with high population growth and high greenhouse
gas (GHG) emission scenario [SRES A2 (24)] and assuming no ben-
eficial effects from the highly debated CO2 fertilization (3, 25, 26) in
the underlying crop yield simulations with the gridded global crop
model LPJmL (Lund-Potsdam-Jena with managed Land) [figs. S1
and S2; (27, 28)]. In this setting, we explore the effects of high-end
climate change on agricultural welfare indicators, explicitly addressing
uncertainties in patterns of climate change and the importance of trade
regimes. For this, we use 19 different general circulation models (GCMs)
of climate change projections that are implemented in SRES A2 and
for which changes in crop yield patterns are computed, and analyze
two trade regimes. Acknowledging different aspects of biophysical and
socioeconomic uncertainties, we assess the sensitivity of our results to
central assumptions made, including (i) the uncertainty in CO2 fertil-
ization, (ii) additional analyses with different crop growth models as
studied byNelson et al. (29), (iii) two alternative population and GHG
emission scenarios [SRES B1 and A1B (24)], and (iv) agricultural de-
mand elasticity.
To fulfill the demand for agricultural commodities under climate-
impacted productivity, we endogenously estimate the most cost-effective
combination of shifting the production to higher-yielding areas, includ-
ing land expansion into forest and other natural vegetation area, andStevanović et al. Sci. Adv. 2016; 2 : e1501452 24 August 2016investments in yield-increasing technologies (research and develop-
ment), which intensifies production on existing cropland. As a promi-
nent adaptation measure, we assess the effectiveness of global trade
liberalization and its adaptive potential to reduce the pressure caused
by climate change on the agricultural sector. The liberalized (LIB) trade
scenario in our analysis resembles current trade liberalization trends
(30, 31) by relaxing global trade barriers by 10% per decade. The “fixed”
(FIX) trade scenario assumes that the interregional trade patterns, in
terms of relative shares of regional trade flows, are fixed at levels that
are the same as those in year 1995 (see the Supplementary Materials). The
FIX trade scenario should not be seen as a baseline scenario because
current trade is already substantially liberalized. In contrast, it should
be seen as a counterfactual scenario that allows the estimation of the
benefits of trade according to competitiveness. Trade regulations are in-
cluded into the model in the form of regional self-sufficiency con-
straints. These can be interpreted as being equivalent to quotas for
domestic supply, such that government revenues or spending from
trade policies (for example, tariffs or subsidies) are not explicitly esti-
mated but become part of consumer or producer rents.RESULTS
Global climate change impacts
In both trade scenarios, climate change causes mostly positive trends
in global producer surplus and negative trends in global consumer
surplus toward the end of the century (Fig. 2). As a result of climate
change, crop yields decrease in many areas, and producers are com-
pelled to intensify production and/or expand cultivated areas, which
leads to a rise in marginal cost of production compared to the refer-
ence scenario where no climate change occurs. As a consequence, the
agricultural market responds with higher commodity prices, enabling
producers to gain on average. On the other hand, consumers will have
to pay more for the same basket of goods, and thus lose part of their
surplus. Overall, consumers’ losses exceed producers’ benefits, creating
the negative trend in agricultural welfare; this result is also consistent
with other studies (12, 15, 19, 20, 32).
Averaged across all 19 GCM scenarios, there is a small positive
climate change effect on global agricultural welfare in the beginning
of the simulated period, reaching approximately 0.1% of global GDP
(projected in SRES A2) in the year 2015 in the LIB and FIX trade sce-
nario (US$34 billion and US$37 billion, respectively; table S1). There-
fore, initial moderate levels of change in temperature and precipitation
patterns, especially in temperate zones, can reduce the cost of agricul-
tural production, having a positive effect on global agricultural welfare.
The positive relative change is slightly stronger in the FIX scenario be-
cause it is verymuch constrained by fixed trade patterns, creating higher
production costs, and therefore, beneficial warming would lead to a
marginally bigger drop in prices compared to that in the LIB scenario
(Fig. 3). As negative climate change impacts on crop yields intensify
over time, the impacts on aggregate agricultural welfare become ad-
verse after 2030, arriving at the loss of 0.3% of projected global GDP
in the LIB scenario (US$884 billion) and 0.8% in the FIX scenario
(US$2502 billion) in the year 2095 (table S1). Hence, in the LIB case
where international trade becomes almost entirely free by the end of
the century (table S2), global agricultural welfare losses in 2095 can be
avoided by around 65% compared to the counterfactual scenario where


















Fig. 1. Conceptual approach forwelfare analysis in agriculturalmarket.
(A) Concept of agricultural market with one good and inelastic demand curve
(as implemented inMAgPIE). Themarket equilibrium is establishedat theprice
P* and the quantity Q*. Consumer surplus is shaded in blue, and producer
surplus is shaded in red. The total welfare is defined as the sum of consumer
and producer surpluses. (B) After the shock on the supply side, the supply
curve is shifted to the left, creating a newmarket equilibrium E′ at the price
P′, whereas the quantity Q′ equals the fixed demanded quantity Q*, result-
ing in the new level of consumer and producer surpluses. (C) Resulting pos-
itive change in producer surplus (hatched in red, S2E′X) and negative change
in consumer surplus (hatched in blue, P*E*E′P′) and total welfare (hatched in
gray vertical lines, S1E*E′S2) after an upward shift of the supply curve.2 of 9
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 Trade liberalization is also a suitable measure to prepare for the un-
certainty in climate change, especially with respect to the uncertainty in
spatial patterns of climate change impacts. Uncertainty in the LIB trade
scenario is considerably reduced because of the adaptive potential of
trade. In a world with liberalized trade, it is easier to respond to climate
change impacts, and especially to impacts from extreme weather events
and subsequent fluctuations in agricultural production, by spatially re-
allocating agricultural production.Moreover, all climate scenarios in the
LIB scenario are almost certain in the sign of the impact (after 2065)
measured by all indicators, that is, producer surplus is always positive,
whereas consumer surplus and overall agricultural welfare are always
negative (red shaded area in Fig. 2). On the other hand, the uncertaintyFig. 2. Global climate change impacts on agricultural welfare indicators (% of projected global GDP in the SRES A2 scenario; without CO2
fertilization effect). For each climate scenario (19 GCMs) used in the analysis, actual modeled changes in welfare are represented by dots,
whereas solid lines for all three panels connect average values of calculated impacts for every simulated time step. Shaded areas depict double
SD from the mean.Fig. 3. Global agricultural price index (for all commodities; SRES A2
scenario; without CO2 fertilization effect).Mean value across GCM sce-
narios with the 1 SD bars for LIB and FIX trade scenarios, with and without
climate change effect.3 of 9









 in the FIX scenario is much larger because spatial differences in GCM
climate projections contribute to the substantial uncertainty in the
magnitude of impacts if regional production patterns are inflexible
to respond.
Regional climate change impacts
Climate change increases the prices for consumers independently of
a trade regime in international agricultural commerce (Fig. 3), affecting
almost all regions with negative change in consumer surplus. Distinc-
tively for liberalized markets (LIB), a large part of the agricultural pro-
duction is shifted to the northern temperate zones under climate change,
mainly because of improving environmental conditions for agriculture
(fig. S1) and increased comparative advantage (export is more than
doubled in high-latitude regions NAM, EUR, and FSU compared to the
scenario without climate change, reaching ~160% larger aggregate ex-
port volume in 2095; fig. S3), implying that producers in these regions
can thus benefit more strongly, entirely compensating the loss in con-
sumer surplus. For example, in EUR and FSU (see caption of Fig. 4 and
the Supplementary Materials for the regional acronyms), the created
added value for the agricultural sector in 2095 accounts for approximately
0.5 and 1.3% of projected regional GDP, respectively (US$100 billion
each), and around 0.5% of projected regional GDP in NAM (US$60 bil-
lion) (Fig. 4 and table S3). Regions at lower latitudes lose in agricultural
welfare, where total damage in terms of loss of projected GDP ranges
from −1.5% in SAS to −0.5% in PAS (Fig. 4 and table S3). These losses
are driven by the opposite dynamics, reduced market shares, and thus
lower production and producer surplus, but similar reductions in con-
sumer surplus as in the high-latitude regions, because domestic prices
are dominated by the world market price under LIB trade scenarios.
On the other hand, if the regional relative agricultural import and
export shares are kept constant to historic shares (FIX), impacts of cli-
mate change becomemore accentuated between the individual regions.
For the regions in higher latitudes, climatic change does not pose a
serious long-term risk to agricultural welfare.Most of these are export-
ing regions by historical trade patterns,most dominantlyNAM, followedStevanović et al. Sci. Adv. 2016; 2 : e1501452 24 August 2016by EUR, and, after the mid-century, by PAO. In exporting regions,
potential positive impacts on welfare are typically distributed to pro-
ducers who profit from increased demand driven by global popula-
tion change and from rising agricultural prices. This, in turn, has an
adverse effect on domestic prices because domestic marginal cost of
production rises with augmented domestic production for exports.
The magnitude of loss in consumer surplus in the exporting regions
is almost equivalent to the gain in producer surplus, resulting in a neg-
ligible impact on total agricultural welfare in these regions. Consumers
benefit only if a region is not a net exporter, and climate change pos-
itively influences domestic production (for example, FSU).
Unlike higher-latitude regions, the exporting regions in lower lati-
tudes in the FIX scenario, such as LAM, experiencemore severe climate
change impacts on crop yields, and as a consequence, the magnitude of
loss in consumer surplus outweighs potential benefits on the producers’
side, reflecting increasing domestic prices. The same dynamics are ob-
served for other tropical and subtropical regions that aremore import-
oriented. Themost dominant negative impacts on agricultural welfare
occur inMEA and SAS (Fig. 4, figs. S4 and S5, and tables S3 to S5). Both
regions are characterized by significant biophysical limitations for ag-
ricultural production (land and water), and if trade barriers are high,
increasing agricultural demandwill put further pressure on the supply
side. Already in 2045, the climate change damage in these regions will
account for 1.2 and 1.4% of their assumed GDP and, by the end of the
century, will reach 4.6 and 3.1%, respectively. Other importing regions
in the FIX scenario follow with negative climate change impacts but to
a lesser extent, with the loss in agricultural welfare attributed to climate
change ranging from 0.6% of regional GDP in CPA to 1.3% of that
in AFR.
Also at the regional level, liberalization of trade appears to repre-
sent a good adaptation option to climate change in agriculture. Com-
pared to the welfare losses in the FIX trade scenario, economic climate
change impacts can be abated by liberalized trade for almost all re-
gions throughout the entire century. Regions in the northern hemi-
sphere, where agricultural production is often constrained by coldpril 16, 2018Fig. 4. Climate change impacts on regional agricultural welfare (% of projected regional GDP in the SRES A2 scenario; without CO2 fertilization
effect). Average values (lines) and uncertainty (double SD from the mean; shaded area) across different climate model projections (see Fig. 2). The figure
shows outcomes for the 10 socioeconomic MAgPIE regions: AFR (Sub-Saharan Africa), CPA (Centrally Planned Asia), FSU (Former Soviet Union), EUR
(Europe, including Turkey), LAM (Latin America), MEA (Middle East–North Africa), NAM (North America), PAO (Pacific OECD), PAS (Pacific Asia), and
SAS (South Asia).4 of 9
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 temperatures, profit from climate change and liberalized trade because
their export increases faster than that in the FIX trade scenario. Con-
sumers in tropical and subtropical regions benefit the most in the LIB
scenario. Although the level of consumer surplus will still decrease
with intensifying climate change, the loss is considerably reduced in
contrast to that in the FIX scenario. Furthermore, big importing re-
gions, such as MEA and SAS, substantially abate climatic impacts
on agricultural welfare by taking advantage of lower global agricultural
prices compared to the prices under the FIX scenario. They lose 1.1
and 1.5% of their projected GDP in 2095, respectively. Opening up to
the worldmarket dampens domestic prices through increased region-
al import for some goods, which then reduces the amount of the same
goods produced locally and cuts producer surplus. Historically export-
ing regions in the low latitudes, such as LAM and PAO (fig. S3), see
stronger climate change impact on agricultural activities and gradually
lose their share in the global market in the LIB scenario because excess
agricultural production is displaced to more favorable regions.
Uncertainties in the results
Despite the existing uncertainties from climate model projections
(GCMs), our results show clear negative climate change impacts on
global agricultural welfare toward the end of the 21st century in the so-
cioeconomic scenario of SRES A2 (Fig. 2 and table S1). Notably, the
magnitude of the impacts significantly depends on the degree of inter-
national trade liberalization.We focus our analysis on the SRES A2 sce-
nario here because patterns are easier to identify under strong changes
in population, emitted GHG, and climate as represented by the SRES
A2 scenario.However, our general findings are robust against the choice
of the socioeconomic scenario (see the analysis of SRES B1 and A1B in
addition to A2 scenario in the Supplementary Materials, fig. S6, and ta-
ble S6). Results show that the patterns of impacts are preserved; that is,
although producers will benefit from climate change at the global level,
consumers will suffer, and the total impact on agricultural welfare will
be negative. In addition, trade proves to have an even greater potential
to buffer the damage. However, the overall level of damages decreases
with lower population growth rates and lower emissions of GHG, and
thus, limited climate change.
The assumption of inelastic demand inMAgPIE could be partly re-
sponsible for the high price response under a climate shock and for the
related potential upward bias in the estimated monetary impacts. We
test for the sensitivity of price indices if consumers would ex post re-
duce their demand according to the anticipated rise in prices in our
standard LIB scenario with climate change effect (Fig. 5 and table
S7). The results indicate that this reduction in demand would only
slightly offset the global price shock from climate change. The highest
demand reduction and consequent decline in agricultural prices are
observed in the tropical regions that are affected more strongly by cli-
mate change (Fig. 5 and table S7). In addition, the low price elasticity of
food as a necessity good further decreases with development because
the share of the value added from primary products declines relative to
other factors in agricultural value chain (33). Because stronger climate
impacts are projected to occur mostly in the second half of the century,
many of the current low-income countries will be more developed and
have less elastic demand responsiveness to prices in the future (fig. S7).
As indicated by many other agro-economic models, the response of
demand to increasing food prices is relatively small (33, 34); thus,
the bias from inelastic demand in MAgPIE should not be a key deter-
minant in the projected impacts.Stevanović et al. Sci. Adv. 2016; 2 : e1501452 24 August 2016The potential overestimation in producer surplus could also stem
from the assumption that demanded quantities are not affected by
price change, although regional supply could still be altered through
international trade channels. Because there is no deadweight loss in
welfare since the demand is inelastic, any further input of marginal
land with lower yields would raise the price and increase the profit
gained on more fertile areas. However, inferring from the uncertainty
test for the demand curve, the overstatement of producer gains also
could not be large enough to influence the derived conclusions.
Another aspect of uncertainty in the results is the simulated crop
productivity under changing climate conditions (5, 28, 35). Variations
in yield projections among global gridded crop models (GGCMs),
such as LPJmL, which is used in this analysis, stem not only from dif-
ferentmodeling approaches but also from a choice of representing im-
portant biochemical processes and parameterizations that are crucial
for plant growth (5). We compare the results from the LPJmL-MAgPIE
modeling suite by deriving MAgPIE simulations with biophysical
climate change impact projections on crop yields from four other
GGCMs for the SRES A2 socioeconomic scenario but with only one
climate scenario (GCM) (Fig. 6 and table S8). The uncertainty inmag-
nitude of impacts across different GGCMs is considerable (0.1 to 1.7%
loss of projected global GDP in 2085 in the LIB scenario); however, the
general patterns are robust against the choice of GGCM. The magni-
tude of impacts strongly depends on the choice of GGCM and, most
prominently, on the assumption of the effectiveness of CO2 fertiliza-
tion (Fig. 6). Here, we contrast results from two crop models that ac-
count for the CO2 fertilization effect: LPJmL and pDSSAT (parallel
Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer) (36). Both
crop models indicate that CO2 fertilization effects could more than
counterbalance the welfare losses compared to cases when CO2 effect
is not considered. Themaximal compensation of losses happens around
mid-century (144 and 124% offset in 2045 for LPJmL and pDSSAT,
respectively) whenCO2 fertilization contributes to overall positive im-
pact on global agricultural welfare (an increase of 0.1% of global pro-
jected GDP). However, our sensitivity analysis shows that for both
scenarios that assume full effectiveness of CO2 fertilization, the bene-
ficial influence on agricultural markets cannot compensate for climate-
driven damages toward the end of the 21st century. The effectiveness
of CO2 fertilization to translate into higher agricultural productivity at
field scale is highly debated and can also reduce the nutritional value of
crops (3, 25, 26, 37, 38). More research not only on the biophysical
effects but also on implications for agricultural market response is
needed in this respect.Fig. 5. Sensitivity of prices.Analysis of an expost demand reduction effect
on agricultural price index for the LIB scenario with climate change. Lines
connect global index mean values across all GCMs. Bars display 1 SD from
the mean. Shades show the range of regional price indices.5 of 9








We find that high-end climate change impacts on crop yields lead to
increasingly negative impacts on global agricultural welfare toward
the end of the 21st century because consumer losses outweigh producer
benefits. However, those impacts could decrease in magnitude with
slower future demographic development, reduced climate change im-
pacts, or reduction in demand in agricultural markets, or they could
even be offset if positive atmospheric CO2 fertilization effects on crop
yields can be realized at large scales. Global warming and free trade
favor agricultural production at higher latitudes and benefit agricul-
tural welfare there despite increasing domestic prices and losses in
consumer surplus. Still, positive impacts on total agricultural welfare
in EUR and FSU are subject to large uncertainties from climate change
projections (GCMs).
Global economic damage, measured as agricultural welfare loss,
can reach the annual amount of roughly 0.8% of projected GDP at
the end of the century if the international trade is inelastic at 1995
patterns over the simulation period (1995–2095). This estimate can
be seen as the high-end value of agro-economic damage, in a scenario
with strong climate change without CO2 fertilization effect on crop
yield, under the assumption of inelastic demand and without further
elimination of world trade distortions. However, extreme weather
events that are likely to increase in frequency and strength with climate
change (39) are not captured by our model; neither does it capture soil
degradation or eventual pests and diseases (40) nor effects of climate
change on other economic factors, such as labor productivity (32). Sim-
ilarly, trade liberalization could not only stall but also deteriorate to an
evenmore restrictive regime than that of 1995. By gradually liberalizing
trade, this damage can be reduced by approximately 65% (that is, to
0.3% of GDP or a loss equal to 6.8% of agricultural GDP on the basis
of the estimated 4.2% share of agricultural GDP in total GDP at the end
of the century; table S9). The importance of trade in determining im-
pacts on prices, and consequently on welfare, is clearly demonstrated in
our analysis (Fig. 3). However, given the difficulties in defining a metricStevanović et al. Sci. Adv. 2016; 2 : e1501452 24 August 2016that works for both drivers, it is hard to conclude if trade regimes are
more important than climate change or vice versa, or if the relative im-
portance of trade and climate change simply reflects how different the
scenarios for each driver are. To contrast the importance of trade im-
pacts against the importance of climate impacts, one would need to use
a wider range of trade scenarios and corresponding climate change pro-
jections to obtain a robust insight on relevance rank of both drivers.
Although an open trade policy that allows for increasing flows in
agricultural commodities is a good way to adapt to future climate im-
pacts, certain caveats apply. Trade liberalization could have major con-
sequences on the environment because increasing agricultural
production in favorable locations could lead to additional GHG emis-
sions, for example through deforestation, increased use of fertilizers, or
intensified livestock production (13). The link between trade liberaliza-
tion and potential environmental impacts calls for a closer integration of
trade and environmental policies in international negotiations (41).
Free trade cannot entirely compensate monetary losses in agricul-
ture caused by climate change. Moreover, this damage is unequally dis-
tributed between consumers and producers and among different
sociogeographic regions. Even in the case of liberal trade, certain consu-
mers and producers will be worse off. There is a clear tendency that
consumers in all regions will end up payingmore for agricultural pro-
ducts. On the other hand, given that many subsistence and smallholder
farmers live in developing regions, policies will have to be advanced to
help them to adapt their production under changingmarket conditions
(42). In light of the recent Bali Package trade agreement (43), which was
part of the Doha Development Round trade negotiations within the
World Trade Organization (44), appropriate policy reforms can be jus-
tified based on this study because trade liberalization is beneficial for
abating climate change impacts on agricultural welfare. However, re-
gions that are bound to see decreases in export shares as a consequence
of climate change (for example, LAM in our analysis) have an incentive
to implement policies to support domestic production, for example
trade barriers or export subsidies to domestic producers, which couldn
 April 16, 2018Fig. 6. Global climate change impacts on agricultural welfare indicators for different global gridded crop models. LPJmL (27, 28), pDSSAT (36),
EPIC (Environmental Policy Integrated Climate) (49), and Pegasus (50) without CO2 fertilization effect and LPJmL and pDSSAT with CO2 fertilization
effect. Estimated impacts are simulated under HadGEM2-ES RCP8.5 climate projection and SRES A2 socioeconomic scenario. The GGCM data are
obtained from Rosenzweig et al. (5) as used in the study of Nelson et al. (29), with projections running until 2085.6 of 9
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ing effect of climate change on the gradient between developed and de-
veloping countries, trade policies will also have to be accompanied by
measures for poverty reduction in developing countries. Food security
measures have to be actively supported, and the agents’ adaptive capac-
ity to the dynamics of liberalization has to be taken into account. o
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 MATERIALS AND METHODS
Themain tool in this analysis is the MAgPIE partial equilibriummodel
(see the SupplementaryMaterials; fig. S2) (13, 16, 17, 23). On the basis
of a regional demand for agricultural products and biophysical en-
dowments on a regular geographic 0.5° × 0.5° grid resolution, themodel
generates optimal land use patterns by minimizing global produc-
tion costs. The recursive dynamic nature of the model is reflected in
a 10-year time-step optimization from1995 to 2095 through the linkage
between optimal land use patterns from the previous period that are
taken as a starting point for the current period. The initial period is cali-
brated to the arable area reported by the Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation (FAO). At the top level, MAgPIE operates on 10 socioeconomic
regions. The demand for food is regionally defined and given as an ex-
ogenous trend to the model, encompassing 16 crop and 5 livestock
types. The estimates for calorie intake for each region are obtained from
a country cross-sectional regression analysis on population and GDP
(23). The future demand projections are based on the SRES scenario
storylines. In addition to food, the agricultural demand consists also
of feed, material, and bioenergy demand. Feed demand is based on feed
baskets defined for each livestock production activity and depends on
regional efficiencies, whereas the material demand is implemented in
proportion with food demand. In this model setting, we account for
first-generation bioenergy demand, which is established on current
land-based fuel production policy targets (second-generation bioenergy
demand is omitted in this analysis).
The supply side inMAgPIE is determined by different production
costs, biophysical crop yields, and availability of water. The informa-
tion on rainfed and irrigated crop yields, water availability, and water
requirements for every grid cell are provided by the LPJmL model
(27, 28). LPJmL is a dynamic global vegetation, hydrology, and crop
growth model that simulates biophysical and biogeochemical pro-
cesses in plant growth, taking into account all relevant climate factors
(temperature, precipitation, radiation, and CO2) and soil and land use
types. Climate projections of 19GCMs from theCMIP3 (CoupledModel
Intercomparison Project phase 3) project (45) were bias-corrected and
supplied to LPJmL as monthly data fields of mean temperature, precip-
itation, cloudiness, and number of wet days.
The objective function of the optimization process is to minimize
global agricultural production costs. Because the demand is inelastic,
the main decision on how to allocate land for cropping activities is
based on production costs and interregional restrictions on trade. In
the MAgPIE model, four different types of costs are defined: factor
requirements, technological change, land conversion, and transport
costs. Factor requirements costs are defined per ton of produced crop
type and differentiated between rainfed and irrigated production
systems. They represent costs of capital, labor, and intermediate inputs
(such as fertilizers and other chemicals) and are implemented on the
regional scale using the cost-of-firm Global Trade Analysis Project
(GTAP) data (46). Crop production can be increased in a region byStevanović et al. Sci. Adv. 2016; 2 : e1501452 24 August 2016investing in yield-increasing technological change (47) or by extension
of agricultural production into other nonagricultural areas suitable for
plant cultivation (figs. S8 and S9). Land conversion from forest and
natural vegetation into arable land comes at region-specific costs.
Transport costs are calculated from the GTAP database and assure
paying for a quantity of goods transported to the market in a unit
of time needed to cover the distance. All MAgPIE regions fulfill part
of their demand by domestic production, which is founded on regional
self-sufficiency ratios. If domestic production does not cover regional
demand, goods are imported from regionswith excess production. Export
shares and self-sufficiency ratios are calculated from the FAOSTAT
database (48) for the initial year (1995). Trade between regions can be
liberalized in future time periods by relaxing the trade barrier, and thus
allowing for a certain share of goods freely traded, on the basis of regional
comparative advantage. In every time step, trade is balanced at the
global level (13).SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/2/8/e1501452/DC1
Supplementary Materials and Methods
fig. S1. Summary of the climate change effect on maize rainfed yield.
fig. S2. Schematic methodological description.
fig. S3. Regional net trade.
fig. S4. Climate change impacts on regional agricultural consumer surplus.
fig. S5. Climate change impacts on regional agricultural producer surplus.
fig. S6. Global climate change impacts on agricultural welfare indicators for SRES A2, B1, and
A1B scenarios.
fig. S7. Regional agricultural price index and regional GDP per capita.
fig. S8. Land use intensity index validation.
fig. S9. Cropland validation.
table S1. Climate change impacts on global agricultural welfare indicators.
table S2. Maize consumer price.
table S3. Climate change impacts on regional agricultural welfare.
table S4. Climate change impacts on regional producer surplus.
table S5. Climate change impacts on regional consumer surplus.
table S6. Global climate change impacts on agricultural welfare indicators for SRES A2, B1, and
A1B scenarios.
table S7. Sensitivity of prices to an ex post change in demand.
table S8. Global climate change impacts on agricultural welfare indicators for different global
gridded crop models.
table S9. Summary of climate change welfare effects as changes in total and agricultural GDP.
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